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CHAPTER 2 
How to Evaluate the Science of Non-human 
Animal Use in Biomedical Research and Testing: 
A Proposed Format for Debate 
Ray Greek 
President, Americans for Medical Advancement (AFMA), 
California, United States 
Lisa A. Kramer 
Professor of Finance, University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada 
1 Introduction 
Over time, the interpretation of science has occasionally been corrupted by 
vested interest groups, be they financially motivated or ego driven. Scientific 
consensus and widespread public beliefs usually catch up with the evidence, 
but this can take a very long time and often costs lives. The use of non-human 
animals in biomedical research and testing is a scientific endeavor and, as such, 
can and should be evaluated in light of the best science currently available. 
But facts that have been accepted in all areas of science are routinely ignored 
or called into question by well-funded, vested interest groups, compromising 
the scientific integrity of biomedical research. History is replete with examples 
of practices deemed scientifically viable in one era, but later abandoned as 
more facts about the material universe were discovered. There are also many 
instances of practices being rejected by the scientific establishment, in spite 
of the fact that they were valid based on scientific criteria. In this chapter, we 
discuss why science is important in the context of animal modeling, how sci­
entific positions are currently evaluated through the peer-review process, and 
how an evaluation of the science of animal modeling should be conducted 
now. We reach the conclusion that, in order to formally evaluate the scientific 
viability of animal modeling, a debate is urgently needed with experts in the 
relevant fields of science reviewing pro and con arguments written in position 
papers. 
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2 Context 
The use of non-human animals in science, in general, and in biomedical re­
search and testing, in particular, has historically been controversial. Formal 
objections to the practice emerged as early as the seventeenth century, primar­
ily based on moral objections (Franco, 2013). The peak controversy, perhaps, 
began with the popularization of the animal rights movement, circa 1975. Wel­
fare concerns aside, there are many stakeholders with vested interests in the 
continued use of non-human animals in research. First, many scientists and 
nonscientists worldwide are employed, either directly or indirectly, due to the 
use of non-human animals in biomedical science, with jobs spanning both 
private-sector and publicly-funded entities. The volume and variety of entities 
that conduct and/or fund animal-based research complicates any attempt to 
quantify the dollar magnitude of associated expenditures; but a conservative 
estimate indicates that at least us$10 billion is spent annually on animal-based 
research and testing in the United States, only taking account of funds originat­
ing from the National Institutes of Health (Monastersky, 2008). If one consid­
ers other grant-funding sources and private-sector sources, both in the us and 
in the many other countries where non-human animals are used, the amount 
spent annually is likely many orders of magnitude more than this conservative 
figure. 
Of course, human nature is such that people generally oppose technological 
changes which may render their own employment obsolete or may otherwise 
interfere with their personal objectives. Furthermore, people may even be re­
luctant to embrace technological change that simply alters the specific tasks 
they undertake in completing their work. For instance, scholarly researchers 
who have entire laboratories devoted to animal modeling may be reluctant to 
consider adopting non-animal-based research methods if doing so might re­
quire the development of new tools, jeopardizing their publishing prospects 
or their ability to continue training graduate students to emulate the type 
of research they have always undertaken. That is, it takes time and effort for 
people to develop new skills, and people are naturally averse to changes that 
might require that they do so. Additionally, universities and other research in­
stitutions rely on research grant overhead fees as a form of revenue to help 
cover the administrative costs of running their organizations. When a sizeable 
portion of that overhead-fee revenue stream originates from grants that fund 
animal-based research, executives and even employees at those institutions 
may be reluctant to consider a future free of animal modeling. A researcher at 
Columbia University wrote that one reason animal modeling continues is due 
to the "frailties of human nature. Too many eminent laboratories and illustri­
ous researchers have devoted too much of their time to studying malignant 
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diseases in mouse models, and they're the ones reviewing one another's grants 
and deciding where the NIH [National Institutes of Health] money gets spent. 
They're not prepared to concede that mouse models are basically valueless for 
most cancer therapeutics" (Raza, 2015, p. 232 ). 
In recognition that a wide variety of conflicts of interest can influence 
scholarly researchers, including non-monetary, Nature Research journals, for 
example, require authors "to declare any competing financial and/or non­
financial interests," including "present or anticipated employment by any or­
ganization that may gain or lose financially through this publication"; unpaid 
memberships or advisory positions; writing or consulting for an educational 
company; and other considerations (see Nature Research, 2011). Because of 
vested interests-whether monetary, emotional, or philosophical-the out­
come of any change in the animal-model paradigm has the potential to affect 
many people adversely, some of whom are represented by societies, lobby­
ists, nonprofits, nongovernmental organizations, and other groups that may 
be keen to attract media attention to promote their agendas. Consequently, 
vested interests can interfere with the adoption of progressive policies and 
behaviors. 
The social and political atmosphere surrounding animal use is similar to that 
of other science-based controversies ( or in some cases, pseudo-controversies), 
such as vaccines, global warming, and genetically modified organisms (GM o s ). 
There are typically advocates on both sides of such issues, and it is often the 
case that one needs an advanced science background to understand the rel­
evant issues. Thus, the general public, and even some scientists, may not be 
able to determine rightly which side the scientific facts actually support. The 
more money at stake in any given debate ( e.g. , the interests of the oil and 
coal industries in the context of the global warming controversy), the more 
propaganda will likely emerge, potentially confounding the public's ability to 
understand and evaluate the facts. Even when there is scientific consensus 
because of overwhelming evidence-as there is on the overall effectiveness 
of vaccines, the safety of GM o s in terms of human health, and the existence of 
global warming-the opposition can be so well funded and prone to promot­
ing unscientific points of view that the general public can almost be forgiven 
for incorrectly believing there exists real controversy on these points. 
Regarding the use of non-human animals to model human responses to 
drugs and diseases, articles questioning the scientific viability of the practice 
began appearing in the scientific literature in the 1980s. These critiques have 
taken various forms and, unfortunately, have included arguments that appear 
on the surface to be science-based, but are in fact not valid science-based at­
tacks. The first four of the following five points list the most common themes 
of these attacks, and we provide a brief explanation of why each argument 
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lacks merit. The fifth point represents a valid objection to animal modeling, by 
which we mean the objection is logical and is based on scientific facts. In the 
discussion that follows, we make frequent reference to the concept of predic­
tive value. We refer the reader to the empirical evidence section of Chapter 17 
(in this volume), for a detailed discussion of the mathematical calculation of 
numerical predictive value. Briefly, predictive value is an important metric by 
which a test or methodology correctly identifies an outcome or condition in 
humans. The specific threshold by which a particular modality is deemed to 
have an acceptably high predictive value varies by context. In medicine, where 
lives lie in the balance, one could argue that nothing short of 100% is accept­
able. In some cases, even drugs tested with modalities that offer predictive val­
ue as high as 99.9% have been pulled from the market due to life-threatening 
consequences. In practice, animal models have predictive value below 50%, 
making them less informative than a coin flip and rendering them of no practi­
cal use in predicting human outcomes. Given the poor predictive value of ani­
mal modeling, Kramer and Greek ( 2019) propose existing drug development 
and disease research resources ought to be redirected towards personalized 
medicine, a new field which offers the promise of 100% predictive value due to 
its basis in each patient's own unique genetic makeup. 
We now tum to listing the most common critiques of the use of non-human 
animals to model human responses to drugs. 
1. The methodology of the experiment was poor, and, therefore, animal model­
ing should be abolished This argument is invalid because implicit within 
the argument is the false premise that if the methodology had been good 
then that would have reflected well on the viability of the entire para­
digm of animal modeling. Of course, the use of good or bad methodol­
ogy in a given experiment is not sufficient for making general statements 
about whether animal modeling should be abolished overall. 
2. The history of medical science has not been as dependent on animal model­
ing as we have been led to believe, and, therefore, animal modeling should 
be abolished This argument is invalid. Whether or not the current state 
of modem medical science was dependent on researchers having used 
animal models in the past has no bearing on whether the continued use 
of non-human animals is vital. Decisions about any future use of animal 
models should be based on modem scientific knowledge about whether 
animal models have predictive value for human outcomes, taking into ac­
count information that may not have been available or considered when 
past decisions were made. 
3. Review articles conclude that specific non-human animal species have not 
been vital to various medical developments, and, thus, animal modeling 
should be abolished This argument is not valid. Even if it were true that 
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specific non-human animal species were not essential parts of specific 
medical advancements, this would not be a sound basis for evaluating 
whether the overall use of animal models has predictive value for human 
outcomes. 
4. There are now alternatives to using non-human animals, and, therefore, an­
imal modeling should be abolished. There exist alternatives to many uses 
of non-human animals in science but not others. Currently, for example, 
there are no toxicity tests that have high enough predictive value for hu­
mans. Nor can we ethically instrument the human brain the way we do 
in non-human animals. The position in this point is further weakened by 
the fact that it does not address whether animal modeling is scientifically 
viable in the first place, nor does it offer a scientific theory to tie together 
areas where animal use is successful and areas where it is not. 
5. The paradigm of animal modeling is not scientifically viable for predicting 
human response to drugs and diseases, and, thus, animal models should 
not be used to predict human response to drugs and diseases. In contrast to 
the previous four points, this particular point is based on critical think­
ing, logic, and scientific facts; and, hence, it is a valid scientific argument. 
Scientific knowledge from complexity science and evolutionary biology, 
supported by empirical evidence, establishes that animal modeling does 
not have predictive value for human outcomes. Past research in these 
areas was summarized by authors, including Greek and Rice ( 2012 ), La­
Follette and Shanks (1996), Lafollette and Shanks (1998), and Shanks 
and Greek (2009), forming the basis for trans-species modeling theory 
(TSMT): "While trans-species extrapolation is possible when perturba­
tions concern lower levels of organization or when studying morphology 
and function on the gross level, one evolved, complex system will not 
be of predictive value for another when the perturbation affects higher 
levels of organization" (Greek and Hansen, 2013a, p. 245). 
In Chapter 17 in this volume, Greek and Kramer (2019) discuss TSMT in great 
depth. Briefly, TSMT draws on established knowledge in evolutionary biolo­
gy and complex systems science to draw the conclusion that animal models 
cannot be predictive of human response to drugs and disease. We refer the 
interested reader to Chapter 17 for further details. TSMT is the only scientific 
argument that invalidates using animal models to predict human response to 
perturbations that occur at higher levels of organization. TSMT is also the only 
critique of animal modeling that both explains past apparent successes and 
failures and why future reliance on animal models will lead to continued sig­
nificant failures in predicting human responses (Greek, 2014; Greek and Han­
sen, 2013a,b; Greek and Menache, 2013; Greek and Rice, 2012;Jones and Greek, 
2013). Unlike TSMT, points 1-4 above do not offer any definitive resolution to 
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the animal modeling controversy; indeed, many animal modeling advocates 
agree with various aspects of these points. Furthermore, points 1-4 offer no 
scientific evaluation of the problem, nor do they make reference to science to 
support their assertions. Point 5, in contrast, is based on valid scientific foun­
dations, and, hence, we focus here on TSMT as the only viable opposition to 
the paradigm of animal modeling. 
TSMT is a theory and, like all scientific theories, it is consistent with the 
following definition from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, 
and Medicine (2017): "In everyday usage, "theory" often refers to a hunch or 
a speculation. When people say, "I have a theory about why that happened," 
they are often drawing a conclusion based on fragmentary or inconclusive 
evidence. The formal scientific definition of theory is quite different from the 
everyday meaning of the word. It refers to a comprehensive explanation of 
some aspect of nature that is supported by a vast body of evidence". Stated 
differently, fact-supported theories should not be guesses but, instead, must 
be reliable accounts of the real world. To that end, the facts associated with 
evolution and complex systems have been established beyond doubt by obser­
vation and experiments. Furthermore, there is extensive empirical evidence 
from animal modeling to support TSMT. Additionally, TSMT is characterized 
by consilience-it agrees with facts from other fields. It is also falsifiable and 
generalizable, and it offers predictions for future outcomes. TSMT fulfills all of 
the qualifications for a scientific theory. 
In this chapter, we suggest a peer-reviewed debate process by which scien­
tists and society, in general, could formally evaluate the scientific validity of 
the statement in point 5 and, in so doing, could resolve the deep disagreement 
about the predictive value of animal modeling. This process could have been 
applied in the past and lethal errors would consequently have been avoided. 
It could also be applied to other science-based controversies facing society. 
The peer-reviewed debate we recommend is not a panacea appropriate for 
all disagreements. Many disputes in life ( and even those relating to the use of 
non-human animals in certain contexts) do not center on science but rather 
arise due to fundamental differences in opinion, which are rooted in ideology. 
However, the process we propose is appropriate for settling controversies re­
lated to science, such as those that arise in the context of using animal models 
as predictors of human outcomes. 
3 Why Science Is Important 
The use of non-human animals in science and science education is not con­
fined to biomedical research and testing where predictive value is touted as an 
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TABLE 2.1 Nine categories of animal use in science and research (Greek and Shanks, 2009) 
1. Non-human animals are used as predictive models of humans for research 
into such diseases as cancer and AID S. 
2. Non-human animals are used as predictive models of humans for testing 
drugs or other chemicals. 
3. Non-human animals are used as "spare parts", such as when a person 
receives an aortic valve from a pig. 
4. Non-human animals are used as bioreactors or factories, such as for the 
production of insulin or monoclonal antibodies or to maintain the supply 
of a virus. 
71 
5. Non-human animals and animal tissues are used to study basic physiologi­
cal principles. 
6. Non-human animals are used in education to educate and train medical 
students and to teach basic principles of anatomy in high school biology 
classes. 
7. Non-human animals are used as a modality for ideas or as a heuristic 
device, which is a component of basic science research. 
8. Non-human animals are used in research designed to benefit other ani­
mals of the same species or breed. 
9. Non-human animals are used in research in order to gain knowledge for 
knowledge sake. 
objective. There are, in fact, many categories of animal use, as shown in Table 2.11 
some of which do not lean on predictive value as a determining factor for using 
non-human animals. 
In general, it may be possible to justify the use of non-human animals as­
sociated with Categories 3-9 based on scientific grounds, without reliance 
on predictive value for perturbations that occur at higher levels of organiza­
tion. For instance, one can make a logical argument, with valid reference to 
science, to support the claim that human lives may be saved by using tissue 
retrieved from an animal (Category 3) or to make the claim that one can learn 
about the broad structure of lungs in mammals by examining the lungs of rats 
(Category 6). (This does not rule out the possibility that, in some cases, there 
may also be valid scientific objections; for example, the risk of facilitating the 
cross-species transmission of viruses.) Furthermore, there may exist valid 
ethical objections to the use of non-human animals in specific instances of 
Categories 3-9. We leave aside possible objections such as these for the pur­
poses of this discussion and focus, instead, exclusively on scientific arguments 
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regarding utility. Likewise, using some non-human animals in order to learn 
more about other animals of the same species is scientifically uncontroversial 
in veterinary medical research. However, it is not scientifically justifiable to use 
non-human animals in the context of Categories 1 and 2, for reasons based in 
complex systems science and evolutionary biology (for more details on com­
plex systems science and evolutionary biology, see Chapter 17, the above-cited 
papers regarding TSMT, and the references therein). 
Nevertheless, the literature is filled with cases where researchers make 
(baseless) claims that animal models have predictive value for human out­
comes in the context of drugs and diseases. For example, the widely-used 
Handbook of Laboratory Animal Science states: " [An] important group of ani­
mal models is employed as predictive models. These models are used with the 
aim of discovering and quantifying the impact of a treatment, whether this 
is to cure a disease or to assess toxicity of a chemical compound" (Hau, 2003, 
p. 2). A highly cited article in Clinical Cancer Research states: "GEMS [geneti­
cally engineered mice] closely recapitulate the human disease and are used 
to predict human response to a therapy, treatment or radiation schedule [ . . .  ] 
GEMS that faithfully recapitulate human brain tumors and will likely result in 
high-quality clinical trials with satisfactory treatment outcomes and reduced 
drug toxicities" (Fomchenko and Holland, 2006, p. 5296). The popular text­
book, Animal Models in Toxicology ( Gad, 2007 ), states: "Biomedical sciences' 
use of animals as models [is to] help understand and predict responses in 
humans, in toxicology, and pharmacology [ . . .  ] [B] y and large animals have 
worked exceptionally well as predictive models for humans" (Preface). "Ani­
mals have been used as models for centuries to predict what chemicals and 
environmental factors would do to humans [ . . .  ] The use of animals as predic­
tors of potential ill effects has grown since that time" (p. 2 ). "If we correct­
ly identify toxic agents (using animals and other predictive model systems) 
in advance of a product or agent being introduced into the marketplace or 
environment, generally it will not be introduced" (p. 3). These are but a few 
of the many instances where researchers make vastly over-reaching claims 
about the prediction value of animal models. A balanced assessment of 
the overall evidence shows, instead, that animal models, for all practical 
purposes, do not have predictive value for human responses to drugs and 
diseases. 
Further to that point, the medical literature contains many papers that 
show, based on the (standard) statistical concept of predictive value, that there 
is no basis to continue using non-human animals to predict human response 
to drugs and diseases (Greek, 2014; Greek and Greek, 2010; Greek and Hansen, 
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2013a; Greek, Pippus and Hansen, 2012b; Greek and Rice, 2012; Greek, Shanks 
and Rice, 2011b; Shanks and Greek, 2009; Shanks, Greek and Greek, 2009 ). Since 
advocates of animal modeling appeal to the predictive value argument to jus­
tify their use of non-human animals, the onus is on those advocates to clearly 
establish predictive value. Yet, such evidence based on predictive value, which 
may support of the use of animal models, is notably absent from the scientific 
literature. That evidence is also absent from the legally binding documents that 
the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees and funding bodies, such 
as the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the us, require animal modelers 
to sign, testifying that their projects have a reasonable expectation to translate 
to humans. The lack of evidence is a direct consequence of the fact ( shown by 
the studies cited above, and, in tum, the many studies they cite) that responses 
to perturbations, such as drugs and diseases, in an animal have effectively no 
predictive value for responses in humans. 
The fact that animal models do not have predictive value for human re­
sponses has several important implications, including the following: 
1. The extent to which the general public supports the use of non-human 
animals in research rests on an assumption that the outcome of the re­
search benefits humans directly. For example, writing in Nature, Giles 
states: "public opinion is behind animal research only if it helps develop 
better drugs." ( 2006, p. 981) Since animal models do not have predictive 
value for human outcomes, their use should be abandoned. 
2. Continuing to use non-human animals in the absence of predictive value 
wastes time and money ( see Chapter 10) which could instead be devoted 
to scientifically valid pursuits. 
3. Various members of the pharmaceutical industry and various scientists 
have acknowledged the failure of the animal model for predicting hu­
man responses to drugs and diseases (Arrowsmith, 2011a,b; Ennever, 
Noonan and Rosenkranz, 1987; Fletcher, 1978; Food and Drug Adminis­
tration, 2004; Johnson et al. , 2001; Kola and Landis, 2004; Kummar et al. , 
2007; Lumley, 1990; Morgan et al. , 2012; Seok et al. , 2013; van Meer et al. , 
2012). Nevertheless, there is a widespread belief among lawmakers and 
members of the public that animal models cannot be abandoned until 
"alternatives" have been developed. The logic behind this belief is spe­
cious. To demonstrate this, we offer the following thought experiment. 
Imagine if regulators were to choose which drugs to endorse for human 
use based on a simple coin flip ( e.g. , heads, we allow humans to use a 
given drug; tails, we do not). Such an approach would do nothing to en­
sure the safety or efficacy of drugs reaching the market. This is because 
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coin flips do not have predictive value for determining human responses 
to drugs. Consequently, it would make no sense to continue using coin 
flips to choose drugs until an alternative to coin flips could be identified. 
Likewise, animal models do not have predictive value in determining hu­
man responses to drugs, and their use must be halted independent of 
whether an alternative exists. 
4. Animal-based research lacks predictive value for human responses to 
drugs and diseases, and, thus, it is reckless to continue to justify the use 
of animal models with myths about protecting humans in clinical trials 
or learning about human disease. Abundant theoretical and empirical 
evidence has established unequivocally that the animal model does not 
have predictive value for humans and indeed cannot. Thus, the only sci­
entifically valid conclusion is to stop attempting to use animal models 
to predict outcomes for humans. See Kramer and Greek (2018) for an 
extensive discussion of the many ways various groups of human stake­
holders, including but not limited to patients, are directly harmed by the 
continued use of animal models. 
While the vested interests we described earlier have served as an obstacle to 
acceptance of the fact that animal models do not have predictive value for 
human responses, the truth has, nevertheless, been acknowledged in the sci­
entific literature, on occasion. For example, Markou, Chiamulera, Geyer, Trick­
lebank ( of Eli Lilly) and Steckler ( of Johnson and Johnson) state: "Despite great 
advances in basic neuroscience knowledge, the improved understanding of 
brain functioning has not yet led to the introduction of truly novel pharmaco­
logical approaches to the treatment of central nervous system (CNS)  disorders. 
This situation has been partly attributed to the difficulty of predicting efficacy 
in patients based on results from preclinical studies [ mainly animal studies, 
although in vitro would also be included in preclinical studies] [ . . .  ] Few would 
dispute the need to move away from the concept of modeling CNS diseases in 
their entirety using animals" (Markou et al. , 2009, p. 74). Additional examples 
include: Alini et al. (2008); Arrowsmith (2011a, b); Begley (2003a, b); Butler 
(2008); Contopoulos-Ioannidis, Ntzani and Ioannidis (2003); Crowley (2003); 
Dragunow (2008); Editorial (2010, 2012); Ferdowsian and Beck (2011); Geerts 
(2009); Grant, Green and Mason (2003); Hackam and Redelmeier (2006); 
Hampton (2006); Hoerig and Pullman (2004); Holmes, Solari and Holgate 
(2011); Hurko and Ryan (2005); Ioannidis (2004);Jin and Wang (2003);Johnston 
(2006); Kaste (2005); Langley (2014); Ledford (20081 2012); Leslie (2010); Lieb­
man (2005); Lindi, Voelkel and Kolar (2005); Mankoff et al. (2004); Marincola 
(2003); Markou et al. (2009); Mullane and Williams (2012); Pammolli, Magazzi­
ni and Riccaboni (2011); Philips (2004); Pound et al. (2004); Pound and Bracken 
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(2014); Reynolds (2012); Rosenberg (2003); Rothwell (2006); Sena et al. (2007); 
Smith (1987); van der Worp et al. (2010); Xiong, Mahmood and Chopp (2013); 
and Zerhouni (2005). 
Further evidence that animal models are extremely limited in what they 
can inform, regarding druggable targets and future cures, comes from a com­
ment in the American Journal of Medicine about Contopoulos-Ioannidis et al.'s 
( 2003) article: 
The article by Contopoulos-Ioannidis et al. in this issue of the Journal 
addresses a much-discussed but rarely quantified issue: the frequency 
with which basic research findings translate into clinical utility. The au­
thors performed an algorithmic computer search of all articles published 
in six leading basic science journals (Nature, Cell, Science, the Journal of 
Biological Chemistry, the Journal of Clinical Investigation, the Journal Ex­
perimental Medicine) from 1979 to 1983. Of the 25,000 articles searched, 
about 500 (2%) contained some potential claim to future applicability 
in humans, about 100 ( 0.4%) resulted in a clinical trial, and, according to 
the authors, only 1 ( 0.004°/o) led to the development of a clinically useful 
class of drugs ( angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors) in the 30 years 
following their publication of the basic science finding. They also found 
that the presence of industrial support increased the likelihood of trans­
lating a basic finding into a clinical trial by eightfold. [ . . .  ] Still, regardless 
of the study's limitations, and even if the authors were to underestimate 
the frequency of successful translation into clinical use by 10-fold, their 
findings strongly suggest that, as most observers suspected, the transfer 
rate of basic research into clinical use is very low. 
CROWLEY, 2003, p. 503 
Note that of the 101 articles that formed the primary focus of Crowley's study, 
about 64% were animal studies. An Editorial (2010, p. 499) in Nature supports 
the above position: 
The readers of Nature should be an optimistic bunch. Every week we 
publish encouraging dispatches from the continuing war against disease 
and ill health. Genetic pathways are unravelled, promising drug targets 
are identified and sickly animal models are brought back to rude health. 
Yet the number of human diseases that can be efficiently treated remains 
low-a concerning impotency given the looming health burden of the 
developed world's ageing population. The uncomfortable truth is that sci­
entists and clinicians have been unable to convert basic biology advances 
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into therapies or resolve why these conversion attempts so often don't 
succeed. Together, these failures are hampering clinical research at a time 
when it should be expanding. 
Given the vast amount of money that funds animal-based research and test­
ing, the many hours of human effort that are devoted to these pursuits, and 
the reliance of all humans whose well-being relies on scientific knowledge for 
maintaining health and treating disease, there is an urgent need for unbiased, 
expert scientists to assess the predictive value of animal models. We propose 
a debate for this purpose, and we now turn to outlining the parameters for 
ensuring such a debate is sound. 
4 How to Evaluate Scientific Arguments 
Science is a process of observing the material universe, possibly conducting 
experiments related to those observations, and ultimately ascertaining facts. 
According to E.O. Wilson (1999, p. 58): "Science [ . . .  ] is the organized, systematic 
enterprise that gathers knowledge about the world and condenses the knowledge 
into testable Laws and principles." Often, time will determine whether a given 
scientist's conclusions are representative of the material universe. But in the 
interim, the best method for separating fact from fiction involves the peer­
review process. The peer-review process uses experts in specific areas of sci­
ence to evaluate the work of others and to determine whether the research and 
conclusions of that research are reliable enough to be published in a science 
journal for dissemination to a broad readership. 
The peer-review process of scientific journals works as follows. A number of 
experts are asked to review a submission to the journal and determine ( among 
other factors): 
- whether the submission is in accordance with known facts about our cur-
rent scientific understanding 
- whether the terms and assumptions are consistent with proper usage 
- whether the methodology is appropriate 
- whether the statistics were correctly calculated 
- whether or not there are flaws in the authors' reasoning 
- whether the findings are likely to be of interest to the scientific community, 
policy makers, and/or the general public. 
This process is not foolproof, but under the appropriate circumstances, it is 
usually capable of separating potential facts from sheer nonsense. Depend­
ing on the contents of the submission, experts from several different areas 
of science may be asked to review the submission and judge the part of the 
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submission that falls under his or her area of expertise. We propose that some­
thing akin to this peer-review process should be employed in order to evaluate 
the scientific viability of using one species to predict response for another in 
the context of developing drugs and treating diseases. 
The peer-review process has been used repeatedly to resolve disputes in 
many scientific settings, for instance at conferences where select scholars pre­
sented evidence for and against a particular position in front of an audience of 
other experts in the field. A consensus is sought, if not in terms of who is right, 
at least in terms of which statements can be taken as fact and which must still 
be taken as conjecture. However, many controversies in science have, instead, 
been left to simply play out on their own without interference in the form of 
peer review. Some of these events have had lethal consequences. For example, 
in 1847, Ignaz Semmelweis introduced the idea that the unwashed hands of 
medical students and physicians spread the disease known as puerperal fever, 
an infection related to child bearing. Despite the fact that his patients dem­
onstrated a reduced mortality rate after he and his students began washing 
their hands, his colleagues ostracized him, and his idea died along with many 
more patients. Had experts been convened to study and debate the evidence, 
antiseptic techniques would have been developed much sooner and many 
mothers' lives would have been saved (Ataman, Vatanoglu-Lutz, and Yildmm, 
2013 ). Other prominent examples of scientific breakthroughs being ignored in­
clude the following: Barbara McClintock's idea of jumping genes, transposons, 
was ignored by a mostly male establishment in biology. McClintock could not 
even find a publisher for her research. Darwin's theory of evolution was almost 
forgotten in the early twentieth century. Alfred Wegener's idea of continental 
drift was ignored because he did not propose a mechanism for the notion. 
Science has also allowed nonsense to go unchallenged until someone pub­
licly proved the status quo wrong or, occasionally, until disaster occurred. Some 
cases persisted simply because no one exhibited the courage to disrupt the sta­
tus quo; unfortunately, history is full of such examples. The Columbia disaster 
of 2003 occurred because the craft was allowed to launch despite engineers 
knowing there were problems with the tiles (Langewiesche, 2003). Similarly, 
the space shuttle Challenger disaster of 1986 was caused by engineers ignor­
ing a problem with the 0-rings. Descartes' unsubstantiated assertions con­
vinced society that non-human animals were not sentient, and some members 
of society are still clinging to that position. Smoking was defended by some 
physicians for years because they were employed by the tobacco industry 
(Jackler, 2015). Scientific consensus can also be wrong. For instance, Earth con­
traction theory was wrong and was eventually replaced by Wegener's move­
ment of continents and eventually plate tectonics. Newton was shown to be 
partially wrong by Einstein's theory of relativity. Some of Einstein's objections 
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to quantum mechanics turned out to be wrong. The notion that ulcers were 
relieved by decreasing anxiety and drinking milk was abandoned after Mar­
shall proved that ulcers were the result of an infectious disease, and research 
revealed that milk actually stimulated acid production in the stomach. Peer­
review, debate, and the convening of experts at conferences, all played a role 
in ensuring that obsolete scientific views were replaced by positions rooted in 
modem knowledge. 
Science has historically advanced slowly and by consensus, which is why 
Planck (1949, pp. 33-34) stated: "A new scientific truth does not triumph by 
convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its 
opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with 
it." Reaching consensus slowly and methodically can have its advantages in cer­
tain contexts; but when lives are at stake, as was the case with Semmelweis and 
is the case with using animal models to predict human outcomes, a slow pace is 
not acceptable. The debate we propose can help expedite the formal evaluation 
of conflicting views and is especially appropriate for facilitating discussions 
about complex topics with foundations that span multiple disciplines. 
5 Peer-reviewed Debate 
We propose to borrow elements of the process used in peer-reviewed science 
journals and implement them in a debate format to evaluate the scientific is­
sues surrounding the use of animal models, specifically, to resolve whether 
non-human animals have a high predictive value in terms of modeling human 
response to drugs and diseases. The scientific literature contains an abundance 
of articles that ought to convince a scientifically-minded reader that animal 
models do not have predictive value for human response to drugs and diseas­
es; a small sampling includes, Arrowsmith (2011a, b); Crowley (2003); Greek 
(2012, 2016); Greek and Greek (2010); Greek and Hansen (2012, 2013a); Greek, 
Hansen and Menache (2011a); Greek and Menache (2013); Greek, Menache and 
Rice (2012b ); Greek and Rice (2012); Greek, Shanks and Rice (2011b ); Hurko and 
Ryan (2005);Jones and Greek (2013); Marincola (2003); Mullane and Williams 
(2012); Shanks and Greek (2008, 2009); and Shanks, Greek and Greek (2009). 
We propose the debate as a supplement to the existing literature, not only to 
help promote scientific consensus but also to reach a much broader audience 
of interested parties, including members of the general public. 
A formal debate, sponsored by a government or major science organiza­
tion and with implications for future funding and legislation, would compel 
the animal model community to participate and address the problems with 
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animal modeling. Engaging in less formal debates, including traditional oral 
debates organized by university departments or student groups ( as we have 
done frequently; see Sandgren and Greek, 2007; Skolnick and Greek, 2005), has 
far less scope for effecting a change in consensus views about animal modeling. 
The reasons for this are many, including the fact that layperson members of the 
audience typically do not understand the science ( and there are typically no 
expert judges present to help the audience evaluate the debaters' positions); if 
there are judges present, their expertise may not span all the areas of science 
that are pertinent to a full and careful evaluation of animal modeling; and time 
and format constraints prevent the debaters from going into sufficient detail to 
substantiate their cases. We propose a formal debate that would address these 
issues, permitting a fair evaluation of both sides of the debate. We recommend 
the following rules for the debate: 
1. The subject of the debate will be the position that animal models have 
insufficient predictive value for human response to perturbations that 
occur at higher levels of organization ( e.g. , human response to drugs 
and diseases) and the implication that the vast majority of animal use 
in science, in general, and research and testing, in particular, should 
cease. 
2. Each side of the debate will be represented by a single individual who 
is recognized as an expert by the public and the scientific community. 
That individual may, in tum, consult any number of experts for input and 
guidance. 
3. A single person or a group of not more than three people will be appoint­
ed as moderator( s) of the debate. 
4. A panel of scientists who are experts in the relevant fields will act as 
judges and will evaluate the positions put forward by the debaters. These 
panel members may come from academia or industry and must be recog­
nized as experts by the public and the scientific community. In all, 12-20 
scientists will be selected to serve on the expert panel, and their collec­
tive expertise will span and encompasses the following fields: 
a. clinical medicine, in general, as well as infectious diseases, cancer, 
heart diseases, and neurology 
b. statistics 
c. evolutionary biology, including evolutionary and developmental 
biology 
d. clinical research 
e. drug development 
£ personalized medicine 
g. basic research 
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h. complexity theory ( expert( s) should come from the math or physics 
department of a university) 
i. critical thinking, the history of the science behind medical discover­
ies, and philosophy of science, in general ( expert( s) should have ex­
tensive training and credentials in science as well as the stated areas). 
5. The judges and moderator(s) must have no vested interests in the out­
come of the debate, including any of the following: 
a. a direct financial interest in the outcome of the debate, such as cur­
rently receiving money for conducting or facilitating animal-based 
research 
b. a significant indirect financial interest that arises from animal-based 
research or testing 
c. an indirect vested interest, such as having, at least in-part, made one's 
reputation through having conducted research using non-human 
animals 
d. an indirect financial interest in the form of having a first-degree rela­
tive or spouse who currently receives or formerly received funding for 
animal-based research or testing 
e. a philosophical or emotional interest in the use of non-human animals 
in research and testing, such as well-known figures from the animal 
protection movement or pro-vivisection/pro animal-use movement. 
6. The debate itself will consist of the following steps: 
a. The debaters, panel members, and moderators will agree on a set 
of panel members, textbooks, or position papers that specify basic 
principles of science and critical thinking. Any disagreements will be 
settled by the expert in the relevant area prior to the proceeding with 
next steps and will be disclosed by the moderator( s) in the last step 
of the debate. This will encourage all parties to play fairly, as the com­
munications will be a matter of record. 
b. Each of the debaters will submit a written position paper. 
c. If the judges have questions or comments about the position pa­
pers, they will compile them and submit them to the appropriate 
debater( s ). 
d. Each debater will have the option to respond in writing to the set of 
judges' questions/comments. 
e. The judges will render their judgement after evaluating the position 
papers and ( if appropriate) responses. The judges' evaluations must 
be based on the validity of each side's position, as stated in the posi­
tion paper and responses to questions, and each side's adherence to 
the rules of engagement. In evaluating this set of information, each 
judge must verify (based on their respective area of expertise) whether 
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the provided evidence supports the debaters' claims and whether 
the arguments and reasoning in the position papers are sound and 
valid. 
£ The judges will compile a list of claims made in each side's position 
paper which were rejected by the judges as false or unsubstantiated, 
as well as instances in each position paper which were deemed by the 
judges to be inconsistent with the agreed-upon principles of critical 
thinking and science. Advance knowledge that these disclosures will 
occur, will encourage all parties to play fairly, because all of their state­
ments will be a matter of record. 
g. The full proceedings, including the names of all participants, the 
position papers, the judges' questions and comments, the debater's 
responses, the judges' final decision, and the disclosures described 
above will all be published in a scholarly outlet, such as an open­
access journal. 
6 Conclusion 
Science has evolved since the time when animal modelers first began using 
non-human animals in earnest in the nineteenth century. But never have ex­
perts convened to formally examine the evidence for and against the continued 
use of non-human animals. The debate we propose for this purpose, conduct­
ed in public and judged by unbiased experts, is long overdue. There is no argu­
ment in modern society about whether scientists should receive funding to 
develop a perpetual motion machine; this is because science has established 
that such a device cannot exist. Analogously, society's continued investment 
in animal modeling can and should be evaluated based on its scientific merit. 
Given the fact that governments and businesses devote scarce resources and 
vast sums of money to the enterprise of using animal models to predict human 
responses to drugs and diseases, and the fact that human lives are at stake, 
there is an urgent need to evaluate whether science supports the continua­
tion of this practice. The debate we propose would serve as a significant step 
forward to that end. 
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